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Abstract: With the parallel growth of the Android operating system and mobile malware, one of the ways to stay pro-
tected from mobile malware is by observing the permissions requested. However, without careful considera-
tion of these permissions, users run the risk of an installed app being malware, without any warning that might
characterize its nature. We propose a permission-based risk signal using a taxonomy of sensitive permissions.
Firstly, we analyse the risk of an app based on the permissions it requests, using a permission sensitivity index
computed from a risky permission set. Secondly, we evaluate permission mismatch by checking what an app
requires against what it requests. Thirdly, we evaluate security rules based on our metrics to evaluate corre-
sponding risks. We evaluate these factors using datasets of benign and malicious apps (43580 apps) and our
result demonstrates that the proposed framework can be used to improve risk signalling of Android apps with
a 95% accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
One of Android’s major security mechanisms for en-
forcing restrictions on the privacy-related data and
specific device operations that an application can
access is permission control (Barrera et al., 2010; Felt
et al., 2011c). Permissions are requested by appli-
cations as features describing an app’s behaviour, in-
dicating its attempt to interact with the device, local
data or other apps (Enck et al., 2011). Some of the
sensitive device data to which access can be granted
include precise location, SMS messages, phone call
logs, contact list etc., thereby making privacy an im-
portant challenge in the Android permission model.
With the parallel growth of the Android operating sy-
stem and its associated malware (Felt et al., 2011b;
Zhou et al., 2012; Kelly, 2014), one of the ways to
stay protected from mobile malware is by observing
the permissions requested1. However, users do not
fully understand the risks of granting permissions and
the consequent implications (Felt et al., 2012b; Kelley
et al., 2012; King et al., 2011). Users run the risk of
an app being malware during adoption, with no relia-
ble risk signal for characterizing behaviour based on
permission request.
1https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/
persistent-malicious-apps-google-play
However, to assess the risk of installing an app,
users have to rely primarily on community ratings to
identify potentially harmful and inappropriate apps,
even though community ratings typically reflect opi-
nions about perceived functionality or performance
rather than actual risks. We propose risk ratings, such
that when users install a new app, they can assess the
risk of the app being malware based on the behavi-
our characterization described by a permission sen-
sitivity index and a permission mismatch, indicated
by checking required against requested permissions.
The main contributions of this work are summarised
below:
• We provide a risky permission set, independent of
typically known malware patterns, using a taxo-
nomy of sensitive permissions. We created a ran-
king of the risks of Android application permissi-
ons by examining protection levels in the Android
Ecosystem, permission category and permissions
with a demoted security level.
• We provide an analysis of permission mismatch
by evaluating the mismatch in the permissions the
app is requesting and the permissions required for
the functioning of the app. The proxy for the
permission an app requires is an analysis of the
permissions other apps with similar functions are
requesting. We then generate security rules that
show the impact and likelihood of these signals.
• We evaluate our approach on two real-world da-
tasets comprising of benign and malware data-
set. The malware dataset contains 33580 apps,
while the benign dataset contains 10000 apps. We
demonstrate that the proposed framework can be
used to improve user awareness about the risks of
the Android permission system and apps. Our ex-
perimental results show that the proposed risk ra-
tings are reliable with a precision of 97.56%, re-
call of 97.01%, and accuracy of 94.72%.
2 RISKY PERMISSION SET
In this section, we introduce our methodology for ex-
ploring permission-induced risk in Android apps.
1. Protection Level: Android provides a protection
level attribute that characterises the level of sen-
sitivity implied in the permissions requested. The
protection level of the user-granted permissions is
defined as: special, dangerous or normal, in order
of decreasing risk. The first metric for determi-
ning the impact level of permissions is the default
Android security protection level.
2. Permission Group: To avoid overwhelming
users with complex and technical permission
requests, Android organises permissions into
groups related to a device’s core functionalities.
Under this system, permission requests are hand-
led at the group level and a single permission
group corresponds to several permission declara-
tions in the app manifest. When a user grants a
single permission in a group, subsequent requests
of permissions in the same group are granted wit-
hout user interaction. Our second metric involves
ranking permission groups based on the number
of permissions in the group.
3. Demoted Permissions: Our final metric for ran-
king permissions with respect to risk are down-
graded permissions. These are permissions whose
protection levels have been downgraded from hig-
her risk, as they are now being granted by de-
fault. The security implications of these changes
in the Android security state must be considered
in any security solution (Zhauniarovich and Ga-
dyatskaya, 2016).
The revised permission model results in four levels of
sensitive permissions based on the three risk indica-
tors. The taxonomy of sensitive information is pre-
sented in Figure 1.
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 2 provides an overview of the proposed sy-
stem, where an app’s behaviour is characterized by
two risk ratings - its permission sensitivity index and
permission mismatch, in order to explore the risk po-
sed by the app. The permission sensitivity index is
a sensitivity measure of an app based on the indivi-
dual risk of the permissions it requests as determined
by the proposed impact level of Android permissions.
The permission mismatch checks the requested per-
missions of an app against its required permissions.
The proxy for required permissions is an analysis of
what similar apps in the same functional group are re-
questing. The key idea is to compare these presumed
required permissions of an app (inferred from functio-
nal category) with its requested permissions (obtained
from the permission set declared) and estimating any
mismatch between the two. Finally, security rules are
constructed from the risk ratings to characterize an
app behaviour as potentially benign or malicious.
3.1 Permission Sensitivity Index (PSI)
In quantifying sensitive permissions from a security
and privacy perspective, we propose a permission sen-
sitivity index(PSI), which is a function of the permis-
sions requested and their sensitivity level. PSI should
be monotonic such that requesting less sensitive per-
missions reduces the value and vice versa. The over-
whelming evidence indicates that most users do not
understand what permissions mean, even if they are
inclined to look at the permission list (Felt et al.,
2012b; Kelley et al., 2012; King et al., 2011). With
a sensitivity index, users can more easily understand
the risk level of Android permissions and pay more
attention to apps with high-risk values.
One way to approach this is to assign weights pro-
portional to each sensitivity level to capture a numeri-
cal value that ranks the sensitivity of permissions re-
quested with respect to the total number of permis-
sions. In this approach, the PSI is calculated as a
percentage of achieved value with maximal possible
value for the app. While that would prove useful in
some cases, it loses a lot of abstraction in its compu-
tation because it is difficult to determine what an op-
timal weight is. For example, given the request index
of an app, G = [N1, N2, N3, N4] where Ni represents
the number of permissions requested in level i. A po-
tential weight vector W = [1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25] could
be assigned as an ordinal factor that captures the sen-
sitivity of each level. Consider an app A with GA =
[9,0,0,0], and app B with GB = [9,0,0,15]. By com-
puting the sensitivity index using this approach, app
Figure 1: Proposed Impact Levels of Android Permissions (API Level 26).
A is assigned a higher value because all the permissi-
ons requested are in Level 1, while app B is assigned
a lower value because the majority of the permissions
requested are in Level 4, while ignoring the fact that
app A and app B has the same amount of sensitive
permissions in Level 1. This approach does not pre-
sent a true representation of the sensitive permission
request because N4 >N1 ORN2. Moreover, N4 is least-
Figure 2: Proposed framework for Exploring Android Permission-Induced Risks.
sensitive with permissions granted automatically.
Hence, a characterisation of the sensitivity index
should, therefore, be a spectrum from where an app
does not require any permission in each level of sen-
sitivity to when it requires all permission in the sen-
sitivity levels. The sensitivity index should be able
to (i) distinguish between an app that requests sensi-
tive permissions and an app that does not. (ii) distin-
guish between apps that request sensitive permissions
in varying quantity, while capturing the sensitivity le-
vels of the permission request. It is observed that the
extreme case of sensitive permission request occurs
when the app requests a large number of sensitive
permissions in Level 1 and Level 2. This guides our
choice of characterisation, as it makes the previous
example of request patterns of [9,0,0,15] and [9,0,0,0]
identifiable. Finally, the proposed characterisation of
the PSI is along five levels of sensitivity - Moderate,
Low and Very Low (distinguishing apps that do not re-
quire sensitive permissions ); High and Extreme (dis-
tinguishing between apps that require sensitive infor-
mation). Table 1 shows the characterization of the PSI
based on the sensitivity of the permissions requested.
In this work, we only consider the permissions provi-
ded by the Android system, although an app can also
define its own permissions.
3.2 Permission Mismatch
We propose to also evaluate permission risk by deter-
mining the mismatch between requested and required
permissions based on the app category. We seek to
investigate whether there is a mismatch between what
an app is requesting and the functionality(purpose)
of the app. Applications are grouped on distribu-
tion platforms based on the function they provide, e.g.
Health &Fitness, Shopping, Finance etc. The proxy
for requested permissions is the declared permissions,
while the required permissions are evaluated by ana-
lysing permission requests of similar apps within the
same functional category.
The approach to the level of mismatch using the
app-group based approach is to generate a probabi-
lity of occurrence vector, PG, for the permission the
group requires. This serves as the baseline for requi-
red permissions of apps based on their functional ca-
tegories. The vector is of length 66, representing the
set of user-granted permissions. The value of each in-
dex is a function of the number of times apps in the
group requires the permission against the total num-
ber of apps in the group.
To determine the level of mismatch between what
an app is requesting and what it requires, we repre-
sent the permissions it requires and the permissions
its functional group requires in a vector space model.
For each app group, the permission mismatch can be
determined by evaluating the difference in the proba-
bility vector of the occurrence of the permissions in
the app group against the permissions the app is re-
questing. The permission mismatch (MNO) is a set of
permissions an app is requesting whose probability of
occurrence in its group is below the critical threshold
value. The level of mismatch LMA (Equation 1) is pro-
posed as a measure of the sensitivity index of the set
of permissions in MNO.
LMA = PSI(MNO) (1)
The level of mismatch is, therefore, a factor of the
region in which mismatches occur, such that the level
of mismatch is termed low-risk if PSI(MNO) = Very
Low, Low, Moderate, and high-risk if PSI(MNO) =
High, Extreme. We seek to investigate whether the
level of permission mismatch could provide valuable
insights as to determining the behaviour of an app as
benign or malicious.
4 EVALUATION
We have presented a permission-based framework for
risk signals that characterize an Android app behavi-
our. To evaluate this framework, we investigate the
effectiveness of the risk signals in distinguishing bet-
ween malicious and benign applications.
4.1 Study Subjects
We gathered Android malware samples from VirusS-
hare 2, a repository of malware samples to provide se-
curity researchers. The files downloaded are Android
20140324.zip(Mal V1) & 20130506.zip(Mal V2). All
2https://virusshare.com
Table 1: Characterization of PSI.
PSI Characterisation Interpretation Impact
VERY LOW N1=N2=N3=N4=0 App does not request any permissions
Low-riskLOW N1=N2=N3=0;N4>0 App request ONLY Level 4 permissions
MODERATE
N1=N2=N4=0; N3>0
N1=N2=0; N3,N4 >0
App request ONLY Level 3 permissions
OR Level 3 & Level 4
HIGH
N1<=
Gmax[1]
2
N2<=
Gmax[2]
2
(N1 OR N2 6=0)
App requests sensitive permissions in Level 1
OR Level 2 OR Both High-risk
EXTREME
N1 >
Gmax[1]
2
N2 >
Gmax[2]
2
(N1 OR N2 6=0)
App request large sensitive permissions in
Level 1 AND/OR Level2.
the malapps from VirusShare were approved by Vi-
rusTotal3. We also selected the Drebin dataset, Mal D,
a malicious apps dataset from different malware fa-
milies (Arp et al., 2014). Malware was also collected
from Contagio repository4, Mal C and recent samples
from the Koodous repository5, Mal K. Finally, the An-
droid malware dataset, Mal A(Wei et al., 2017) was
used. For the benign app dataset, we downloaded
10,000 apps from the Top 25 categories from Google
Play. After removing corrupt APK malware files and
inaccessible files, the final dataset consists of a total
of 43580 apps, with 33580 being malware6. For each
sample, we extract the permissions requested using
the AndroidManifest.xml file present in the package.
4.2 Validating Sensitive Permission
Categorisation
To validate the risky permission categorisation, we
compare our ranking with alternative ways to find im-
pact levels of Android permissions. We compare our
rankings with the study of (Felt et al., 2012a), which
ranks the risk of permissions according to user ra-
tings. In particular, we compare the ten-highest ran-
ked risks for permissions that are still relevant in the
Android permission system with our proposed sensi-
tivity levels. We present the results in Table 2, where
6 out of the 10 highest risks ranked by users corre-
spond to permissions that belong to most sensitive
level in the proposed ranking system, while the ot-
her four risks correspond to permissions in Level 2.
This suggests that the risk metrics used in the propo-
sed impact level permission corresponds to how users
perceive the impact of Android permissions.
Furthermore, we examine if the characterisation
3https://www.virustotal.com/en
4http://contagiomobile.deependresearch.org/index.html
5https://koodous.com/
6Result files are available at https://www.dropbox.com/
sh/62avus8x7oiaq3f/AABi7cdXGxa1qSjgvGmad0qXa?
dl=0
of the impact levels can be used for describing an app.
We observe the PSI of samples in our dataset to check
if its request pattern matches our prediction of high
risk and low-risk apps based on PSI. For an app to
be in the low-risk category, there are two characteris-
tics: it does not require any Android permission (PSI
= Very Low) or it does not require any sensitive per-
mission (PSI = Low or Moderate). Based on the
PSI of the data subjects, 1.78% of malware apps in
the dataset belong to this category, while 16.01% of
benign apps exhibit such behaviour. For an app to
be a high-risk app, it requires sensitive permissions
in Level 1 or Level 2 (PSI = High or Extreme).
None of the apps in the dataset has a Low psi. This
is the behaviour of apps that require the least sensi-
tive permission in proposed systemic ranking of An-
droid permissions (Level 4). This shows that one
way to characterize an app behaviour is through sensi-
tive permission request. We extracted security rules,
(Rules 01, Rules 02) (Table 3) from the PSI of
the data subjects as a form of measure characterizing
the features identifiable with each class label (1 for
Benign, -1 for Malware).
Malware apps are characterised by risk level of
high based on the permission request patterns. This
justifies the rationale of using permissions to rank the
risk of Android apps. This further supports the risk in-
dicators used and justifies the hypothesis that the sen-
sitivity of the permissions requested by an app is an
important factor in quantifying the risk factor. This
result is particularly interesting with respect to mal-
ware detection, where apps are fingerprinted by ob-
serving their static features, such as the API calls, in-
tent etc. We argue that the PSI would be an enhan-
cement to static feature generation for malware de-
tection of apps. While Rule 02 is characteristic of
a malware, it is not dominant enough to distinguish a
malware from a benign app. However, it shows a war-
ning signal for the kind of apps that should be investi-
gated. Therefore in fingerprinting an app for malware
detection, reliable static features that can be used as
a warning sign:if(PSI = High-Risk). Thus, low-
Table 2: Comparison of User Ratings of Impact Level of Android Permissions and proposed systemic ranking.
Permission UserRating
Impact
Level Permission
User
Rating
Impact
Level
CALL PHONE 97.41% 1 READ SMS 94.48% 1
READ PHONE STATE 97.41% 1 RECEIVE SMS 94.48% 1
SEND SMS 96.39% 1 WRITE SETTINGS 94.39% 1
WRITE CONTACTS 95.89% 2 GET ACCOUNTS 93.37% 2
READ CONTACTS 95.89% 2 READ EXTERNAL STORAGE 90.60% 2
risk apps are more likely to be benign, while high-risk
apps are more likely to be malicious.
Existing approaches have categorised risky per-
missions based on the frequency of occurrence in mal-
ware datasets, benign datasets or a combination of
both. We argue that this approach is limited because
it does not emphasise the dynamic complexity and
evolving nature of the Android permission system.
Android keeps modifying permission space by remo-
ving permissions and also limitations based on mal-
ware dataset space. To justify our reasoning, we con-
sider the permission request pattern of our malware
data size and compare it with current state-of-the-
art risky permission sets in (Peng et al., 2012; Wang
et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014; Sarma et al., 2012;
Enck et al., 2009). In particular, we consider all per-
missions whose probability of occurrence is not zero.
These comparisons show that the permissions consi-
dered by (Enck et al., 2009) are only relevant for 19%
of malware in the dataset, while (Wang et al., 2014)
characterizes 60% request patterns of malware in our
dataset. The reason for the partial characterization of
malware request patterns from these approaches is be-
cause defining risky permission sets in these works
are dataset-dependent.
With the permission sensitivity index, we validate
that when a user installs a new app, they run the risk
of the app being malware and the impact of the risk is
reflected in the categorisation of the PSI, even without
knowing existing malware patterns.
4.3 Level of Permission Mismatch
To gain valuable insight into requested versus requi-
red permissions, the probability of occurrence of in-
dividual permissions for each app group is computed
as the proportion of the frequency of the permission
request divided by the total number of apps in the
group. Using the probability of occurrence, with a
critical threshold set at θ f = 20%, produces some in-
tuitive results, such as that location permissions are
frequently required by apps in the Travel&Local and
Maps&Navigation app category. The probability of
occurrence can be used as a baseline for matching an
app’s requested permission with its required permis-
sions based on its functional group.
To investigate the level of mismatch LMA in the
malware dataset, some malware metadata such as app
title, app category are required. This is to ensure that
the probability-of-occurrence vector used in the ana-
lysis corresponds to the app category of each malware
app. For 49 app categories, we were able to find ex-
actly the same package identifier retrieved from the
apk files of the malware app on the store.
From the identified app categories, we investiga-
ted the level of the mismatch with respect to varying
degrees of critical threshold - θ f = [20%, 35%, 30%,
35%, 40%]. We examined the level of mismatch that
occurs with a malware application requesting a sen-
sitive permission that is requested by less than θ f %
apps in the corresponding benign category. For an
app in the low-risk zone, the permissions reque-
sted closely mirror the permissions required by its
benign counterparts with any mismatch occurring in
less sensitive permission sets (Level 3 and Level 4).
A high-risk app, on the other hand, has permis-
sion mismatches with benign counterparts on sensi-
tive permissions (Level 1 and Level 2). The cor-
relation between the spectrum of critical threshold
against malware that is low-risk and high risk was
found to be strongly negatively and positively cor-
related (R2(θ f ,Nlowrisk = −0.988),R2(θ f ,Nhighrisk =
0.988)). With a set critical threshold, malware apps
tend to request sensitive permissions, rarely required
by their benign counterparts.
To investigate the level of permission mismatch
as a means of distinguishing behaviour, we compare
the level of permission mismatch of each benign app
category with its corresponding malware, at a criti-
cal threshold of 20%. The behaviour is described by
Rules[03-04] in Table 3. We observe that the per-
mission mismatch is indeed distinguishable behavi-
our. While at least 6 out of 10 benign apps do not
have permission mismatches in critical permissions,
at least 6 out of 10 malapps request permissions not
required by other apps in the group, at the 20% thres-
hold.
4.4 Distinguishable Behaviour
The aim of this section is to investigate whether the
combination of these risk ratings could give further
insight into distinguishing the behaviour of malapps
and benign apps.
4.4.1 PSI and Permission Mismatch
Since we have already shown that low-risk PSI apps
are most likely to be benign with a 90% likelihood,
we proceed to show if the combination of a high-risk
psi and the values for the level of mismatch can pro-
vide further distinguishability. We investigate the li-
kelihoods of the combination of the risk ratings with
respect to the dataset as a means of discriminating be-
tween malapps and benign apps. The results are pre-
sented as Rules 05-06 in Table 3.
With these likelihoods, a high-risk PSI and low-
risk permission mismatch are indicative of a benign
app, while a high-risk PSI and high-risk indicates the
presence of a malicious app. Users do not often pay
attention to the textual description of information re-
lated to the risk of permissions in the current android
permission system (Felt et al., 2012b). We show that
the permission sensitivity index and level of permis-
sion mismatch metrics provide a measure of distin-
guishability between malicious and benign applicati-
ons which can improve user attention and awareness
to the risks of Android permissions and apps.
4.4.2 PSI and Distinguishing Permissions
Malicious app developers might select a misleading
category for the app by joining a group whose mem-
ber apps request more permissions, even if functiona-
lity wise, it does not belong to that group. This thre-
atens the validity of the risk rating produced by the
level of permission mismatch. We, therefore, investi-
gate permissions and combination of permissions that
are characteristic of the dataset to form a compound
risk rating alongside the proposed risk signals. Upon
investigating, we discovered single permissions that
clearly distinguish malware from benign apps. The
single permission, READ PHONE STATE was requested
by 98% of malware in the dataset, while the proba-
bility that a malware does not request read access
to the phone state and full network access
is 0.04. This suggests that most malware needs to
read device and phone data with a full network access.
This also supports our criteria for the proposed ran-
king of Android permissions, where the single per-
mission was assigned to sensitivity Level 1 -
most sensitive level, without a prior knowledge of
malware request pattern. We then proceed to inves-
tigate the likelihood of high-risk PSI apps and per-
mission combinations for reliable risk signalling. The
security rules that characterize the reliability of these
features are presented as Rules 07-09 in Table 3.
4.5 Reliability of Risk Ratings
We proceed to show the reliability of the security ru-
les extracted from the proposed risk ratings in iden-
tifying potential malware. The impact is characteri-
zed by the sensitive permissions requested by the app
(PSI), while the likelihood measures the probability
that the security rule belongs to the class label. The
impact and likelihood of these risk signals are presen-
ted in Table 4.
Based on Table 4, benign apps are characterised
by low-risk and high-risk rating values, while malici-
ous apps are only characterised by high-risk values.
These risk signals can be triggered in identifying po-
tential malware. User attention of the risk to Android
permissions and apps can be improved by utilising the
risk information provided by each rule, such that an
app can be triggered as potential malware based on
its level of impact and likelihood based on the Rules.
To evaluate the reliability of these risk ratings, we
evaluate High-Risk PSI and Permission Rules
with the PSI Rules (see Table 4) on a benign and
malicious app dataset. The benign dataset is downlo-
aded from GooglePlay, while the malware dataset is
Mal A(Wei et al., 2017), which provides an up-to-date
picture of the current landscape of Android malware,
categorized in 135 varieties among 71 malware fami-
lies. The results are presented in Table 5, where the
risk rating achieved an accuracy of 95% in reporting
malapps. This indicates that the rules extracted from
the risk ratings well discriminate malapps from be-
nign apps, and thus, permission requests characterize
the behaviours of Android apps to a certain extent.
While our approach shows a good performance for
reporting malapps, it suffers two limitations that im-
pacted on its accuracy - i) malapps that do not require
any permissions, and ii) malapps that have the same
risk rating as benign apps. In such scenarios, relying
on permission request only is not feasible.
Previous studies have shown that community ra-
tings on distribution platforms are not sufficient to
alert users to the level of privacy risk they are exposed
to when they download an app (Chia et al., 2012). In
conclusion, the risk signals can be used as a privacy
risk indicator to support current forms of community
ratings, such that a recommendation system for An-
droid apps using these risk ratings can be built to as-
sist users in their security evaluation of Android apps.
Table 3: Security Rules from Risk Ratings.
PSI Rules LMA Rules PSI & LMA
Rule 01
IF(PSI=LOW-RISK)
THEN Class=1[90%]
Rule 02
IF(PSI=HIGH-RISK)
THEN Class=-1[54%]
Rule 03
IF(LMA=LOW-RISK)
THEN Class=1[65%]
Rule 04
IF(LMA=HIGH-RISK)
THEN Class=-1[65%]
Rule 05
IF(PSI=HIGH-RISK)&(LMA=LR)
THEN Class=1[61%]
Rule 06
IF(PSI=HIGH-RISK)&(LMA=HR)
THEN Class=-1[70.00%]
*LR=LOW-RISK, HR=HIGH-RISK
High-Risk PSI and Permissions Rules
Rule 07
IF(PSI=HIGH-RISK)
AND READ PHONE STATE=1
AND ACCESS NETWORK STATE=1
AND INTERNET=1
THEN Class=-1[75%]
Rule 08
IF(PSI=HIGH-RISK)
AND READ PHONE STATE=0
AND ACCESS NETWORK STATE=1
AND INTERNET=1
THEN Class=1[89%]
Rule 09
IF(PSI=HIGH-RISK)
AND READ PHONE STATE=1
AND CAMERA=1
AND READ EXTERNAL STORAGE=1
AND/OR RECORD AUDIO=1
THEN Class=1[82%,93%]
Table 4: Malapp Reporting Rules.
Class Rule Impact Likelihood
Benign 01,08,09 Low-Risk, High-Risk, High-Risk [90%, 89%,[82%, 93%]]
Malicious 06,07 High-Risk, High-Risk [70%,75%]
Table 5: Detection of Malapps Using Risk Signals.
TP FP FN P(%) R(%) A(%)
18110 452 558 97.56 97.01 94.72
TP = True Positive, FP = False Positive, FN = False
Negative, P - Precision, R - Recall, A - Accuracy
As malicious apps have become more complex, more
features need to be explored in order to improve the
capacity of detectors for the detection of novel ma-
lapps. Our analysis results show that the use of the
proposed risk ratings can be effective in reporting ma-
lapps.
5 RELATEDWORKS
Usability studies on the effectiveness of the Android
permissions system have indicated that the current
permission system does not help most users make in-
formed security decisions about malware threats (Felt
et al., 2012b). The complexity of Android permission
requests has been investigated (Frank et al., 2012).
(Barrera et al., 2010) used a Self-Organizing Map
(SOM) algorithm to visualise the permission-based
systems of the most popular Android apps. (Felt et al.,
2011a) have presented a permission analysis tool, Sto-
waway, that detects overprivilege in Android apps, a
situation in which an Android app requests more per-
mission than necessary. A study of permission evolu-
tion in the Android ecosystem and its usage was con-
ducted by (Wei et al., 2012). PScout was developed,
as an extension to Stowaway, to extract a permission
specification API from Android OS source code with
static analysis (Au et al., 2012). While our methods
also provide a better understanding of permission re-
quest patterns of Android apps, our work examines
the relationship between permission request and their
risk in Android apps as a measure of distinguishing
between malapps and benign apps.
The closest research to our work was reported by
(Enck et al., 2009), (Sarma et al., 2012), (Peng et al.,
2012), (Wang et al., 2013) and (Wang et al., 2014).
Using the permission information as the data source,
the risk presented by an Android app was evaluated by
examining how rare are the permissions request pat-
terns in comparison with the permissions requested
by other apps in the same categories (Sarma et al.,
2012). Probabilistic generative models such as Naive
Bayes could be used for risk scoring and risk ran-
king for apps (Peng et al., 2012). In contrast to the
9 permission rules proposed by Kirin (Enck et al.,
2009), 200 permission detection rules for malapp de-
tection built on risky permissions set were also deve-
loped by (Wang et al., 2014). The common denomi-
nator amongst all these approaches is obtaining fea-
tures from both benign and malicious dataset for ma-
lapp detection. Security rules are then built based on
identified permission request patterns in the dataset.
This approach is often hindered by the evolving na-
ture of the Android permission system. For example,
2 detection rules in (Enck et al., 2009) refer to per-
missions that are no longer supported. Our approach
develops risk ratings that rely on a proposed impact
level of Android permissions independent of a priori
request patterns that emphasize the complex and dy-
namic nature of the Android permission model. 6 out
of the 9 proposed security rules are independent of
known malware request pattern, while 3 depends par-
tially on identified request patterns. Our analysis thus
provides a vision regarding the use of security rules
that are not completely dependent on known permis-
sion request patterns for the detection of malapps.
6 CONCLUSION
We have investigated the feasibility of characterizing
app behaviour using risk ratings from proposed im-
pact levels of Android permission. We demonstrate
that the risk signals can be used to assist layman users
in their security evaluation of Android apps. The first
rating is the sensitivity index of the app based on the
impact levels of requested permissions, the second ra-
ting is on its permission request compared to similar
apps, while the last rating is on its permission that
characterizes class label of apps as benign or malici-
ous. Our result demonstrates that the proposed fra-
mework can be used to improve risk signalling of An-
droid apps with a 95% accuracy.
For risk signalling, the ratings provide a measure
of awareness and scrutiny as a user defence against
malicious applications. For malware detection, a de-
tailed knowledge of app behaviour is essential for
signatures. Existing approaches and future analysis
could incorporate these ratings as the first phase in
prioritizing, especially when a large dataset of apps is
involved. For future work, we are exploring features
to make the risk ratings adjustable to contextual fac-
tors, such as actual usage of permissions in the source
code.
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